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According to the selected effects theory of function, a biological trait’s function is, very 
roughly, whatever it was selected for by natural selection (or some comparable selection 
process). The function of the butterfly’s eyespots is to deflect attack away from vital 
organs because that’s what they were selected for. A chief virtue of the selected effects 
theory is that it makes sense of how function statements can work as teleological 
explanations – which is implicit in at least some strands of biological usage. If functions 
are selected effects, then when we attribute a function to a trait (say, deflection of attack 
to eyespots) we are quite literally offering an explanation for why that trait exists. No 
other account of function – perhaps with the exception of the “organizational theory” – 
even purports to make sense of this feature of biological usage.  
 
A consensus among philosophers of biology is that the selected effects theory was first 
formulated independently by Neander (1983) and Millikan (1984), though perhaps earlier 
work such as Wright (1973), Wimsatt (1972) and Ruse (1971), gestured in that direction. 
One goal of this paper is to challenge that consensus. The forgotten French philosopher 
of science, Edmond Goblot (1858-1935), should be credited with formulating the theory, 
or at least an early incarnation of it. In a series of papers, Goblot (1899; 1900; 1903) 
argued, quite rigorously and explicitly, first, that function statements are teleological 
explanations, and second, that function statements can be teleological explanations only 
if functions are selected effects. My goal is not in any way to undermine the originality 
and insight of Neander, Millikan and their followers. It is rather to ensure that Goblot 
receives long-overdue credit for his prescient discovery.  
 
But this paper does not simply have the goal of insisting that Goblot receive some 
intellectual credit. That fact alone would be worthy of an extended footnote in a 
philosophy of biology textbook, and not a whole paper. Goblot, however, did much more 
than that. He articulated a very distinctive (even by today’s standards) version of the 
selected effects theory. For Goblot, “selection” was much more inclusive than 
evolutionary natural selection. It was even more inclusive than the abstract notion of 
“differential reproduction,” or “differential retention,” as some would have it. For Goblot, 
“selection” refers to a very general process wherein one possibility is realized, to the 
exclusion of another, by virtue of an apparent advantage. For Goblot, evolutionary 
natural selection, and intelligent design, are two subtypes of this abstractly-specified 
process.  
 
Moreover, Goblot seemed to think that this claim – that functions are selected effects 
(when “selection” is broadly construed) – is a conceptual analysis of both lay and 
scientific use of “function.” If Goblot were right, that would be game-changing even by 
today’s standards. For it would imply that the selected effects theory, properly grasped, 
embraces both biological and artifact functions, scientific and lay usage, modern and 
ancient usage. This expansive construal of the selected effects theory deserves serious 
consideration.  
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To be fair, some philosophers of biology have flirted with expanding the selected effects 
theory to be more inclusive, that is, to allow processes other than evolutionary natural 
selection to produce new functions. These thinkers include Millikan (1984) herself, 
Papineau (1984), Godfrey-Smith (1992), Griffiths (1993), Kitcher (1993), and Garson 
(2011). Dennett (1969), Wimsatt (1972), and Wright (1973) also gestured toward the 
possibility of such an all-encompassing theory. Goblot, however, is unique in that he 
joined two ideas that nobody else joined: First, he attempted to specify, rigorously and 
precisely, the nature of this general process of which natural selection and intelligent 
design are subtypes. Second, he posited that this fact, that functions are selected effects – 
when selection is understood in this expansive way – is part of a correct conceptual 
analysis of “function.” This is a new thing.  
 
Unfortunately, it seems to me that, while there’s something right about Goblot’s 
expansive way of thinking about functions, his particular construal of function cannot be 
right. That’s because there’s no single kind of process in the world of which natural 
selection and intelligent design are subtypes. The illusion that there is a single kind of 
process in nature arises from a hidden equivocation in the very idea of “selection for an 
advantage.” As I’ll show, one sense of the phrase points to human choice; the other to 
evolutionary natural selection; these – as Darwin himself recognized – cannot be fused in 
any non-metaphorical way. Though Goblot’s attempt fails, it’s a quite noble sort of 
failure, one that still demands a serious philosophical reckoning.  
 
 
2. Goblot’s Basic Account of Function and Teleology 
 
Goblot wrote two major papers on the topic of function and teleology, “Fonction et 
Finalité” of 1899 and “La Finalité Sans Intelligence” of 1900.1 Crucially, Goblot intended 
the two papers to be read as a continuous whole. This can be seen from the fact that the 
purpose of the first paper is to raise a general problem about biological functions, and the 
purpose of the second paper is to solve that problem. In fact, the first paper actually ends 
with the parenthetical remark “A suivre” – “to be continued.” This is important for us, 
because it helps us to see that the two papers are intended to be read as one long 
meditation on functions.  
 
Though the two papers are meant to be read as one, each pursues a distinct question and 
offers a distinct thesis. The first paper, “Fonction et Finalité,” argues that function 
statements are teleological explanations. When we say, for example, “the function of the 
eyespots on butterfly wings is to deter attacks away from vital organs,” we are, in 
ordinary biological discourse, trying to explain why butterfly wings have eyespots. The 
second paper, “La Finalité Sans Intelligence,” argues that teleological explanations are 
grounded (in a way to be determined) by evolutionary natural selection. Hence, on the 
surface, his position seems nearly identical to that which Larry Wright developed in 
	
1 A third paper, his “La Finalité en Biologie” of 1903, is a commentary on other works 
and will not be discussed here. 
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1973: function statements are teleological explanations (a trait has a function if the trait 
“is there because” it serves the function), and one way that a trait can have a function is if 
it was shaped by natural selection for the effect in question.  
 
As we will see, however, Goblot goes much further by arguing that functions are just 
selected effects, where selection must be construed broadly enough to include both 
evolutionary natural selection and intelligent design.2 Before diving deeply into Goblot’s 
analysis, I’ll turn to the text to draw out Goblot’s own presentation of these two theses. 
Any further analysis we conduct must be based squarely on Goblot’s own words.  
 
His first paper argues that the function of a trait is not just any useful effect it happens to 
have. Rather, a trait’s function is the effect that the trait (in some sense) was made for. 
It’s an effect that plays into an explanation of the trait itself. He begins his analysis by 
pointing out that functions, in the ordinary biological sense of the term, are peculiar and 
worthy of serious philosophical reflection: 
 
Of the properties of cells, tissues, and organs, some are, and others are not, 
functions. Sometimes scientists intentionally use this word function; sometimes on 
the contrary they take care to avoid it; the definition is difficult, but the use is not 
at all arbitrary (1899, 495).3 
 
He then argues that, in ordinary biology, we only call something a “function” when we 
think that the effect in question is somehow part of an explanation for the trait’s 
existence: 
 
The blood cell fixes atmospheric oxygen; it also fixes carbon monoxide and 
nitrogen dioxide…Of these three chemical properties, only the first one is a 
function; and the only reason that one calls it that, is that the cell is made to draw, 
in its passage in the lungs, atmospheric oxygen…If the cell also fixes other gases, 
these properties are not functions, for it is not made for that (1899, 497-8; 
emphasis in original).  
 
The problem, of course, is that it is very difficult to see how an effect of a trait can be part 
of the explanation for that very trait, unless we are invoking some sort of supernatural 
principle, such as divine intervention or a mysterious vital force: 
 
	
2 One might think that this is precisely what Wright (1973) was saying, particularly 
because of his suggestive comments on pages 162-4 about the similarity of the concept of 
selection in natural selection and in intelligent design. One would be mistaken, for 
reasons to be discussed in Section 4. Wright did not think that functions were selected 
effects, regardless of whether “selection” is construed narrowly or broadly. This was, of 
course, a major point of Neander’s (1983) and Millikan’s (1984) critiques. See Garson 
(2016, Chp. 3) for more on the relevant historical background.  
3 All translations from the French are my own.  
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Certain physiologists seem to have a sort of distrust for this idea of finality, 
which, despite them, can be found in all parts of their science. They dare not look 
at it directly; finality seems unknowable; for them, it is an anti-scientific, and 
almost mystical, idea (1899, 499).  
 
Nonetheless, teleology is such a critical part of physiology itself that if we eliminate 
teleology, we eliminate physiology, too:  
 
Does there exist, in the facts, a teleological order? Put differently, is physiology 
possible?...The existence of a teleological order is the postulate of the science of 
life…The physiologist must therefore assume the reality of a teleological order, as 
the physicist assumes the reality of a constant and necessary order (1899, 504-5).  
 
That is the puzzle that his paper ends with: teleology seems both impossible and 
necessary.  
 
The purpose of his next paper, “La Finalité Sans Intelligence,” is, as the title indicates, to 
point the way to a solution. If, in the past, a trait was shaped by evolutionary natural 
selection for a certain effect, then that trait exists now precisely because of that effect. If 
the flower’s nectar glands were selected for attracting insects, then we can rightfully say, 
now, that the nectar glands exist (that is, one reason flowers have nectar glands) because 
they attract insects. When selection is present, a trait’s effect can be cited as part of an 
explanation for its existence, without appealing to theism or vitalism.  
 
But if it happens that an individual character is an advantage, natural selection 
will make of it a species character, and that because it is an advantage. Hence 
again there is finality, but finality without intelligence…It is easy to see that these 
examples [e.g., “the function of nectar glands in flowers is to attract insects”] 
answer to the definition of finality, for the consequent is the raison d’être of the 
antecedents. Cross-fertilization exists because it causes greater fecundity; nectar 
glands, large or brilliant corollas, perfumes exist because they have the effect of 
attracting insects...It would not be exact to say that the effect is here the cause of 
its cause, but it is true to say that it is the reason for it; the existence of the cause 
is explained by the effects that it produces (1900, 402-3).  
 
And later:  
 
[After selection,] the final term [that is, the trait with the function which is now a 
“fixed” species character] no longer has an accidental character, since it is this 
very advantage, which has become a species character. Utility is the origin of 
finality; utility characterizes the initial term, it serves a certain end, but it is not 
made for this end; finality characterizes the final term; it is well made for this 
usage, since it is because of its utility that it became fixed as a species character. 
(1900, 404).  
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In sum, Goblot holds that function statements are teleological explanations, and that 
natural selection can vindicate such explanations, since natural selection shows how a 
trait’s effect can play a role in an explanation of that trait’s existence. As we will see, 
however, Goblot thinks that the relation between function and selection is, in fact, even 
more intimate than this.  
 
 
3. Rethinking Teleology as Selection 
 
What is really innovative about Goblot’s thought, even by today’s standards, is what I 
take to be his core thesis about biological functions, one that is never stated explicitly but 
implied throughout the text.4 I will try to articulate the view as follows: As a matter of 
conceptual analysis, an object has a function when it is the result of an abstract kind of 
selection process. In this selection process, one possibility is realized to the exclusion of 
another on account of something like “the appearance of an advantage [l’apparition d’un 
avantage].” The function of the object is just this advantage. Evolutionary natural 
selection, and intelligent design, are two different subtypes of this abstract process.   
 
My main textual evidence that this was, in fact, Goblot’s view of function, stems from the 
extraordinary closing section of “La Finalité Sans Intelligence.” There, he states that all 
teleology, intelligent or not, somehow involves a selection between possibilities and the 
preferential realization of one over another:  
 
All finality, intelligent or not, is a choice between possibilities…Natural selection 
is the effective trial of all of the possibilities. The one which is the best wins only 
by proof of its superiority. Intelligent finality is more rapid and economical, since 
the possibilities are judged before being tried; or rather, the trials are made ideally 
instead of being carried out. It is also therefore a sort of selection, which operates 
between ideas. The God of Leibniz conceives in thought all of the possible 
worlds; he compares them, judges them, and realizes the best...There is therefore, 
in the divine understanding, competition between the possible worlds and 
selection of the best. Things are no different in our own deliberations. There is a 
competition between the diverse choices we can make, and selection of that which 
is or which seems to us the best. The initial term is always the appearance of an 
advantage; the final term the realization of this advantage. The analogy is 
therefore complete between intelligent and unintelligent finality; only intelligence 
abridges the path and diminishes the effort. Finality, therefore, is not at all the 
characteristic mark and like a seal of intelligence imprinted on its works. 
Intelligent finality is a specific mode of finality in general. (405-6) 
	
4 Bonsack (1976) is the only paper that I’ve encountered that critically engages with 
Goblot’s teleology. His main complaint is that Goblot defines finalité differently in 
different places, and that he introduces inappropriate value notions. I agree with thrust of 
his critique, but I find a unified notion of biological function underlying Goblot’s 
presentation. (I thank Antoine Dussault for drawing Bonsack’s paper to my attention.)  
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In this passage, Goblot leads us through three major areas where teleological statements 
loom large, and shows us that, in each of the three domains, teleology exhibits the same 
fundamental pattern. First, he asks us to consider intelligent design in the creationist 
worldview. Suppose we are willing to agree that some feature of the world is designed by 
God for certain end. We can then ask ourselves: what exactly is God doing when God 
“designs” something? It consists in none other than this: God somehow surveys a vast 
array of possibilities, and chooses to realize one possibility over another because of an 
apparent advantage.  
 
In the lengthy passage cited above, Goblot is quick to point out that the same pattern is 
exemplified in human decision-making. When a person designs something, something 
takes place in her mind that is like a competition between imagined possibilities, and one 
possibility is ultimately realized, over another, because of an apparent advantage.5 
 
Finally, and most importantly, Goblot sees evolutionary natural selection as conforming 
to this basic pattern. Natural selection, he thinks, involves a competition between 
possibilities, wherein one possibility is realized, over another, because of the appearance 
of an advantage. At this juncture, one might suspect that Goblot is playing a semantic 
game with us, or that he is abusing the natural contours of ordinary language. Surely, 
natural selection isn’t a competition between possibilities! To the extent that natural 
selection is a “competition,” it’s a competition between actual organisms (cells, groups) 
and not merely possible ones.  
 
Though natural selection must be seen as a competition between actual, rather than 
possible, beings, for Goblot, natural selection is also, and at the same time, a competition 
between possible species characters. When a new variant arises in a population through a 
genetic mutation – say, the first butterfly with eyespots on its wings – that variant 
represents a possible species character. It is not yet an actual species character; it must 
compete with other variants to earn that title. One thing that natural selection does is that 
it takes a possible species character and transforms it into an actual species character 
because of an advantage it possesses:  
 
But if it happens that an individual character is an advantage, natural selection 
will make of it a species character, and that because it is an advantage. Hence 
again there is finality, but finality without intelligence…(1900, 402) 
 
	
5 Christophe Malaterre has pointed out to me that the French text admits of a different 
interpretation, where “our own deliberations [nos propres délibérations]” refers to an 
interpersonal, rather than intrapersonal, decision-making process. For example, we can 
speak of a committee “deliberating over” various social policies. This interpretation 
would still imply that the kind of function a social policy has is the same kind of thing as 
the kind of function that a biological organ has.  
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2020 
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) 
Please use DOI when citing or quoting 
	
It is because of this somewhat unconventional perspective on natural selection that 
Goblot can see it as conforming to the basic pattern of teleology in other domains. 
 
4. Convergence and Divergence 
 
As I noted earlier, Goblot is not the only person to suggest a deep similarity between 
natural selection and intelligent design. Many philosophers have hinted at a deep 
connection, even identity, between the two sorts of things. It is impossible to do justice 
here, in a rather short paper, to the rich similarities and differences between these 
theorists. Here it will have to suffice to say this: nobody, with the exception of Goblot, 
has ever held this convergence of ideas:  
 
(1) Functions are selected effects. 
(2) “Selection” in (1) must be understood very generally to encompass natural 
selection and intelligent design. 
(3) (1), understood in terms of (2), is a conceptual analysis of both ordinary and 
scientific language.  
 
An all-too-brief perusal of the literature will show exactly how and where Goblot departs 
from others. To begin with, Wright (1973) didn’t accept (1), at least not as a conceptual 
analysis. He thought that, as a matter of conceptual analysis, a function of a trait is just an 
effect that explains the trait’s existence. He does discuss the similarity between natural 
selection and intelligent design, and even the idea that they both exemplify, in a very 
abstract way, a kind of “selection process” (see pp. 163-4), but he never identifies 
function, as a matter of conceptual analysis, with this abstract “selection process.” He 
identifies it with what he calls a “consequence-etiology.”  
 
Wimsatt (1972, 13) seemed to accept that, empirically speaking, functions probably 
always involve selection, where “selection” is understood broadly to encompass both 
natural selection and intelligent design: “the operation of selection processes is not only 
not special to biology, but appears to be at the core of teleology and purposeful activity 
wherever they occur.” But he adamantly rejected that this should be understood as a 
conceptual analysis.  
 
Dennett (1969), too, describes a deep analogy between natural selection and learning, and 
even suggests that selection is at the root of teleology itself (64), though he does not 
develop this insight into a theory of “function” per se. In fact, Dennett has pursued this 
analogy throughout much of his work, particularly in his classification of “Darwinian,” 
“Skinnerian,” and “Popperian” creatures (1995), each of which involves the operation of 
different sorts of selection processes.    
 
Millikan (1984) defined functions in terms of a general process involving the differential 
reproduction of one type of entity over another. Her view of “reproduction” is expansive 
enough to include trial-and-error learning and learning by imitation (p. 28). But in her 
view, differential reproduction does not include the process wherein a person creates an 
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artifact for the first time. (The first hammer did not have a history of differential 
reproduction on account of its past success.) Goblot’s view is, therefore, more inclusive 
than hers. Similarly, Papineau (1984,  557-8) states that mental states can undergo natural 
selection within the lifetime of an individual, and thereby acquire (selected effects) 
functions – but not, presumably, the artifacts that are produced by said mental states.  
 
Kitcher (1993), to whom I’ll return in the next section, says that function is “design,” as a 
matter of conceptual analysis, and that natural selection and intelligent design are two 
subtypes of this “design.” Unlike Goblot, however, he does not articulate what “design” 
is supposed to be such that it encompasses both. That is, he never articulates what this 
non-metaphorical form of “design” is supposed to amount to, other than alluding to 
Darwin’s view that natural selection can be seen as a kind of “design without a designer.” 
 
Neander (1991) holds that functions are selected effects, but only in the sense of 
Darwinian natural selection. Hence, her theory of function is only supposed to apply to 
the biological sort of function, and it is only intended as a conceptual analysis of modern 
biological usage. She notes, in passing, the possibility of a theory like Goblot’s, but 
chooses not to develop it in any detail (p. 175).  
 
Griffiths (1993) sketches a theory of artifact function that rests on the idea that artifacts 
come from a kind of “competition” of ideas. But he says explicitly that natural selection 
and artifact design are quite different things and that there is no single concept of 
function that applies to both (p. 421).   
 
5. A Critique 
 
If Goblot were right, that would be a game-changer for contemporary philosophical 
discussion of function and teleology. That is because it would give us a version of the 
selected effects theory that effortlessly captures teleology in every domain in which it 
arises, both natural and conscious, human and divine. It would also, as a conceptual 
analysis, unify both modern and ancient usage, as well as scientific and lay usage. For 
Goblot, by “function,” everybody has always meant selected effect.  
 
Unfortunately, Goblot’s expansive analysis of function simply does not work. The reason 
is that there is no single kind of process in the world, loosely called “selection for an 
advantage,” of which both natural selection and intelligent design are two subtypes. 
There is only a strained analogy. Goblot’s view relies, ultimately, on an unacceptable 
anthropomorphism. 
 
The crux of the matter is this: in the standard selected effects theory, an object’s effect 
becomes that object’s function by virtue of the fact that that sort of object has an actual, 
historical, track record of producing that effect. Having an actual, historical track record 
of producing a given effect is necessary for having a function, in the ordinary selected 
effects sense. Artifacts, however, are not subject to this constraint. As far as artifacts go, 
it is possible for the effect of some artifact to be its function even if that artifact has no 
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actual, historical track record of producing that effect. Neander (1991, 174-5) makes 
precisely this point in enumerating the differences between natural and artifact functions. 
The very first twist corkscrew that was ever invented, back in 1795 by the Reverend 
Samuel Henshall, no doubt had the function of opening wine bottles, even though it had 
no actual historical track record of doing so. True, there may have been a kind of “virtual 
selection process” involved in the production of the first spiral corkscrew, a selection 
process that took place in the Reverend’s mind. But the physical corkscrew, that is, that 
physical type of thing, was not selected because it actually ever opened a wine bottle, 
since it had never done so. It was selected because someone (namely, Henshall), thought, 
or surmised, or believed, or reckoned, or figured, that it would have that advantage. But 
anticipated advantages are not real advantages, any more than imaginary ponies are real 
ponies. To say that all function involves something like “selection for an advantage” 
obliterates that distinction.  
 
Let me put the point somewhat differently: Goblot’s argument involves a fallacy of 
equivocation. In the fallacy of equivocation, two or more premises only seem to support a 
conclusion because of a critical ambiguity in a word or phrase that appears in the 
premises. Goblot, I maintain, is guilty of such an equivocation. We can reconstruct his 
argument as follows: natural functions involve selection for an advantage; artifact 
functions involve selection for an advantage; so, natural and artifact functions both 
involve selection for an advantage. The ambiguity is this: in the first premise, the 
“advantages” in question are real, actual advantages; in the second, the “advantages” in 
question are merely imagined or hoped for. But imagined advantages are not real 
advantages – any more than imagined ponies are real ponies. 
 
The problem is analogous to the problem in Kitcher’s (1993) theory of function. Kitcher 
attempts to define “function” simply and solely in terms of “design.” He then says that 
human invention, and Darwinian natural selection, are two subtypes of this “design.” The 
problem is that the apparent unity of the concept of function is purchased at the cost of an 
equivocation: there is no single kind of thing called “design,” of which human choice and 
natural selection are subtypes. The latter is “design” in name only; it is a clever 
anthropomorphism to speak of natural selection as a form of design, but this analogy 




If Goblot is wrong, then what is the right way to think about function and selection? First, 
if we are to maintain that functions are selected effects, we should continue to understand 
“selection” in a relatively narrow sense which requires (not as a sufficient condition, but 
as a necessary one) something like an actual history of differential reproduction, or 
differential retention, on account of the effect in question. It is not enough that some 
agent hopes or anticipates or surmises that the object will have the relevant effect. In 
	
6 That said, there is much to appreciate in Kitcher’s view, in particular the distinction 
between selection having a “direct” versus an “indirect” role in a trait’s function. 
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contrast, functions in the realm of artifacts come about because the artifact bears the right 
kind of relationship to an agent’s mental states – though the precise nature of that 
relationship remains highly contentious. But I think we should give up the search for a 
unified theory of biological functions and artifact functions. Too many smart people have 
tried and failed for that to be a fruitful endeavor.  
 
Now, it may very well be true that, as a rule, when someone produces an artifact, that 
event of production is preceded by something like a virtual selection process in the 
agent’s mind. Dennett (1995) calls us “Popperian creatures” for our ability to carry out a 
hypothetical trial-and-error in our minds before implementing our schemes in the real 
world. But this, in my view, is incidental to an artifact’s having a function. It is not by 
virtue of the fact that a selection process takes place “in the designer’s mind” that the 
artifact acquires a function. As Wimsatt (1972, 15-16) argued some time ago, if God is 
real, and if God had a creative hand in designing the universe or some of the things in it, 
he wouldn’t have had to go through anything like a virtual form of trial-and-error in order 
for his creations to have functions. He would have just known what to do.  
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